Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law by Tuerkheimer, Deborah
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2014
Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law
Deborah Tuerkheimer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tuerkheimer, Deborah, "Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law" (2014). Minnesota Law Review. 308.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/308
  
 
1512 
Note 
 
That’s Not on the Table: Why Employers Should 
Pay for the Walk from the Locker Room to the 
Work Station 
Emily E. Mawer*
Clifton Sandifer arrived at work each day and proceeded to 
the locker room to put on required equipment before walking to 
his assigned work station at the United States Steel Corpora-
tion’s (USS) Gary Works Plant in Gary, Indiana.
 
1 The work day 
equipment included a flame-retardant jacket and pants, safety 
glasses, a hard hat, protective footwear and headgear, leggings, 
and wristlets.2 USS did not pay Sandifer for the time it took to 
don this protective gear at the beginning of the day or the time 
spent doffing the clothing prior to going home, pursuant to a 
custom established under a collective bargaining agreement.3 
In addition, according to a recent Seventh Circuit decision, 
Sandifer’s work day still did not begin when he left the locker 
room.4 Instead, USS did not begin paying Sandifer until he 
reached his work station.5
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; J.B.A., 
2010, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Thank you to Professor Stephen 
Befort for his advice and guidance. Thank you also to my colleagues, the board 
and staff of Minnesota Law Review, for the great work they did to publish this 
Note. Most importantly, thank you to my parents, Mark and Jane, for their 
endless support, love, and encouragement over the years. Copyright © 2014 by 
Emily E. Mawer. 
 However, an employee at USS’s 
Great Lakes Works Plant in Ecorse and River Rouge, Michigan, 
donning the same protective gear as Sandifer, walking to a lo-
cation to perform the same job as Sandifer, is paid for the time 
 1. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2:07-CV-443 RM, 2009 WL 3430222, at 
*1–2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2009). 
 2. Id. at *2. 
 3. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 4. Id. at 596. 
 5. Id. 
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he spends walking between the locker room and the work sta-
tion.6
This inconsistency arose from a recent circuit split between 
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.
 
7 The conflicting decisions con-
cern what constitutes work time for which employers must pay 
their employees.8 The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) estab-
lished the forty-hour work week, but did not define the term 
“work.”9 The courts have since struggled to define the contours 
of the work week.10 In 1944, the Supreme Court defined work 
as “physical or mental exertion . . . controlled or required by the 
employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit 
of the employer and his business.”11 These “principal activities” 
provide the start and end point of the compensable work day.12 
Employers are required to pay employees for all activities be-
tween the first principal activity and the last principal activity 
of the day.13 Even walking time, which is typically exempt from 
the FLSA,14 is compensable during this time, as part of the con-
tinuous workday.15
 
 6. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir. 2010). See 
generally Facilities, UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, http://www.ussteel 
.com/uss/portal/home/aboutus/facilities (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (identifying 
the Ecorse and River Rouge plants as USS facilities). 
 However, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits 
disagree on whether an activity that is not compensable under 
a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to § 203(o) of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act can still be considered a principal ac-
 7. See generally Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596 (holding that the walking time 
is not compensable); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 620 (holding that the walking time 
is compensable). 
 8. See generally Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596 (defining work narrowly); 
Franklin, 619 F.3d at 620 (defining work expansively). 
 9. See Richard L. Alfred & Jessica M. Schauer, Continuous Confusion: 
Defining the Workday in the Modern Economy, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
363, 364 (2011). See generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.  
§ 203 (2012) (failing to provide a definition for the word “work”). 
 10. See Alfred & Schauer, supra note 9, at 363 (“A patchwork of court cas-
es and regulatory guidance has attempted to fill this void, resulting in a varie-
ty of standards and conflicting outcomes.”). 
 11. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 
598 (1944). 
 12. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012) (providing that em-
ployers are not liable under the FLSA for failing to pay an employee for time 
spent “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of perfor-
mance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed 
to perform”). 
 15. IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 37. 
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tivity.16 Thus, in one jurisdiction, the clothing change is a prin-
cipal activity, and the subsequent walking time is paid; but in 
the other jurisdiction employees must reach their work station 
to start their compensable work day.17
Although this litigation focuses on a short period of time, 
the walk from the locker room to the work station, the outcome 
has broader implications. An interpretation allowing employers 
to refuse to pay for the walking time supports an expansive 
right to contract, favoring employers by allowing a broad range 
of employee rights to be placed on the bargaining table. In con-
trast, holding that the walk is compensable promotes a more 
narrow interpretation, preserving rights guaranteed in the 
FLSA for all workers. This conflict over § 203(o) presents an 
opportunity for the Supreme Court of the United States to issue 
a uniform decision, both clarifying the relationship between 
statutory rights and collective bargaining agreements and re-
moving some uncertainty from the paid work day.  
 Specifically, under one 
interpretation, a collective bargaining agreement may remove 
not only changing time from the paid work day, but also the 
walk that follows. 
This Note argues for a narrow interpretation of § 203(o), 
requiring employers to pay for the walk from the locker room to 
the work station. Part I introduces the statutory scheme and 
history of the work week and the relationship between collec-
tive bargaining agreements and the FLSA. Part II discusses 
collective bargaining in America today and examines the previ-
ous attempts at determining a collective bargaining agree-
ment’s effect on the rights conferred in the FLSA. Part III ar-
gues that the U.S. Supreme Court should resolve the circuit 
split and hold that the unpaid changing time is still a principal 
activity and thus the subsequent walking time is compensable. 
Without a clear holding, some jurisdictions give collective bar-
gaining agreements expansive power, beyond the language of 
the statute. By restricting the negotiable statutory terms in a 
union contract to a narrow interpretation of the applicable law, 
the Court would preserve statutory rights for all workers—
regardless of union membership. 
 
 16. Compare Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 
2012) (holding no), with Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir. 
2010) (holding yes). 
 17. See Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596 (holding that an employee must reach 
the work station to start the work day); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 620 (holding 
that the employer must pay an employee for walking time). 
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I.  THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: DEFINING 
“WORK”   
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides that an 
employer cannot “employ any of his employees . . . for a work-
week longer than forty hours unless such employee receives 
compensation for his employment in excess of the hours . . . .”18 
However, the Act does not provide a definition of the word 
“work,”19 leaving employers with little guidance on what activi-
ties make up their employees’ forty hours per week.20
This section will review the evolution of the continuous 
work day and the role of principal activities. It will then discuss 
the relationship between collective bargaining and the Fair La-
bor Standards Act, including previous attempts to interpret 
§ 203(o). 
  
A. PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES AND THE CONTINUOUS WORKDAY 
In 1944, the Supreme Court first gave context to the term 
“work” as used in the FLSA.21 In Tennessee Coal, Iron & Rail-
road Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, three iron ore mining com-
panies asked the Court to decide whether the time employees 
spent traveling in underground mines constituted work.22 The 
Court determined that, in the absence of legislative language to 
the contrary, the term work must be interpreted as it is “com-
monly used—as meaning physical or mental exertion (whether 
burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and 
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the em-
ployer and his business.”23 The Court stressed the danger in-
volved in the miners’ travel, which included exertion as well as 
“hazards to life and limb,” in concluding that the time did con-
stitute work.24
The Court expanded the definition of work two years later 
in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., holding that the time 
employees of a pottery factory spent walking from the entrance 
of the building to their work stations and the time spent don-
 
 
 18. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012). 
 19. Id. § 203 (failing to provide a definition for the word “work”). 
 20. Alfred & Schauer, supra note 9, at 363. 
 21. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 
597–98 (1944). 
 22. Id. at 591–92. 
 23. Id. at 598. 
 24. Id.  
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ning non-protective gear was work time.25 The Court deter-
mined that an employee must be paid for any time she is re-
quired to be on the employer’s premises, even if that time is 
prior to productive work.26 The decision caused outrage in the 
business community over the extension of FLSA coverage for a 
wide variety of activities that were not typically considered 
part of the work day.27 In response, Congress passed the Portal-
to-Portal Act, amending employers’ liability under the FLSA.28 
Congress acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of the FLSA “creat[ed] wholly unexpected liabilities . . . up-
on employers with the results that, if said Act as so interpreted 
or claims arising under such interpretations were permitted to 
stand . . . the payment of such liabilities would bring about fi-
nancial ruin of many employers.”29 The Act removed time spent 
traveling to and from the place of an employee’s “principal ac-
tivities” from compensable time, along with activities before or 
after those “principal activities.”30 Congress left the Court’s in-
terpretation of “work” unchanged; it only created the travel 
time exception.31
The first question the Court addressed under the Portal-to-
Portal Act was the definition of a “principal activity.”
 
32 In Stei-
ner v. Mitchell, the Secretary of Labor sued a battery factory, 
claiming that the time employees at the plant spent changing 
into and out of work clothes and showering at the end of the 
day to reduce their exposure to the toxic chemicals was com-
pensable.33
 
 25. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 690–91 (1946). 
 The employer admitted that these activities were 
“indispensable to the performance of their productive work and 
 26. Id. at 690. 
 27. See Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-
to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 62–63 (1991) (quoting the Business 
Advisory Council on Attitude of Industry on Portal-to-Portal telling Congress: 
“Businessmen do not believe that Congress intended to make any radical 
change in the practices or customs governing the relationship between em-
ployer and employee as to when his compensation started or how much it 
should be provided that the statutory minimum wage were paid . . . .”). 
 28. See Rachael Langston, IBP v. Alvarez: Reconciling the FLSA with the 
Portal-to-Portal Act, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 545, 545–46 (2006). 
 29. Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2012). 
 30. Id. § 254. 
 31. See id. § 251 (lacking a definition for the word “work”); Langston, su-
pra note 28, at 546 (“Significantly, the PPA did not include a definition of 
workday, but left intact the Court’s interpretation of workday as applied to the 
FLSA . . . .”). 
 32. Alfred & Schauer, supra note 9, at 367. 
 33. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 248 (1956). 
  
2014] THAT’S NOT ON THE TABLE 1517 
 
integrally related thereto,” but argued that they were not 
“principal activities.”34 According to the employer, activities “be-
ing performed off the production line and before or after regular 
shift hours” did not fall under the FLSA.35 The Court disagreed, 
holding that activities are compensable under the Portal-to-
Portal Act “if those activities are an integral and indispensable 
part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are 
employed.”36 Thus, the time spent changing clothes and shower-
ing was compensable, as those activities were an integral part 
of the employees’ productive work in the battery factory.37
The Court more recently clarified the extent of the Portal-
to-Portal Act in 2005, in the case IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez.
  
38 The de-
cision clarified the continuous workday rule, holding that any 
activity after the first principal activity and before the last 
principal activity of the day was excluded from the Portal-to-
Portal Act and was therefore compensable under the FLSA.39
Together, Congress and the Court created a system that 
functions so that an employee who is required to don protective 
gear before walking to his work station and beginning his pro-
ductive work, and who is not covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement, must be compensated for the changing time, the 
walking time, and the work time.
  
40 In this situation, the chang-
ing time is an indispensable part of the employee’s work or 
principal activities, so under Steiner it is also a principal activi-
ty.41 Thus, the clothing change is the first principal activity of 
the day.42 The walk to the work station is subsequent to this 
principal activity, but prior to the final principal activity, and is 
therefore part of the continuous workday and compensable un-
der the FLSA.43 Finally, upon reaching the work station, the 
employee begins the physical and mental exertion defined as 
compensable work under the FLSA.44
 
 34. Id. at 251–52. 
 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 256. 
 37. Id. 
 38. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). 
 39. Id. at 37. 
 40. See id. at 40. 
 41. See Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 37. 
 44. See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 
590, 598 (1944). 
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B. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 
ACT 
Congress passed the FLSA at a time when federal policy 
strongly favored collective bargaining.45 Just three years prior 
to the FLSA, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA), in an effort to protect employees’ right to organize 
and allow them to bargain for rights and benefits in the work-
place.46 Thus, the FLSA was not meant to disrupt the ability of 
employers and unions to negotiate.47 When addressing Con-
gress in debates over the FLSA, President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt stated, “We are seeking, of course, only legislation to 
end starvation wages and intolerable hours; more desirable 
wages are and should continue to be the product of collective 
bargaining.”48
The FLSA is the floor for employee rights, not the ceiling.
  
49 
The Act provides a minimum standard, but allows flexibility for 
unions and employers to negotiate beyond the rights afforded 
in the Act.50 Employers themselves may provide, and unions 
may bargain for, a higher wage, a higher overtime compensa-
tion rate, or a shorter workweek than the FLSA requires.51 
However, a union may not waive any employee rights provided 
in the FLSA, including minimum wage, overtime requirements, 
and what activities must be counted as work time.52
 
 45. Anna Wermuth & Jeremy Glenn, It’s No Revolution: Long Standing 
Legal Principles Mandate the Preemption of State Laws in Conflict with Sec-
tion 3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 839, 850 (2010). 
 Further, 
 46. See Richard Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and 
Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Reconcili-
ation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687, 688 (1997). 
 47. Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 45, at 850.  
 48. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 3, 
1938), in 83 CONG. REC. 8, 9 (1938), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb 
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15517. 
 49. See Bales, supra note 46, at 689. 
 50. Id. at 689–90. 
 51. E.g., Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Fact Sheet #17A: Exemp-
tion for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Computer & Outside Sales 
Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), WAGE & HOUR DIVI-
SION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance//fairpay/fs17a_overview.pdf (Ju-
ly 2008).  
 52. See, e.g., Bailey v. Karolyna Co., 50 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) 
(“It has been held that employees cannot bargain away their rights under the 
Act or release their employers from paying the full amounts due thereunder.”); 
Dep’t of Labor, Collective Bargaining Agreements, FLSA HOURS WORKED AD-
VISOR, http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/hoursworked/screen1c.asp (last visit-
ed Mar. 9, 2014).  
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an employer is not relieved of the FLSA requirements, even if 
the requirements are not affirmatively asserted by employees 
through a collective bargaining agreement.53 Finally, an em-
ployer’s reliance on the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment does not preclude an employee from bringing an action to 
collect wages he or she is owed under the FLSA.54 The employer 
is responsible for, at a minimum, complying with the terms of 
the FLSA, regardless of the terms of its contract with its em-
ployees.55
However, in response to the broad interpretations of the 
FLSA in subsequent Court cases, Congress amended the FLSA 
to provide one exception which allows employers to define some 
time as outside of the work day, even though the FLSA normal-
ly requires the employer to pay his or her employees for that 
time.
 
56 According to § 203(o), if an employer, explicitly or by 
custom under a collective bargaining agreement, has estab-
lished that it considers time spent changing clothes or washing 
at the beginning and end of the day to be outside of work time, 
then this time may be exempt from the FLSA’s compensability 
requirement.57
The provision has raised the question of whether the un-
paid change and wash time can still be considered a principal 
activity.
  
58 The discussion led to varying opinions amongst the 
federal district courts, and ultimately to a circuit split between 
the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.59
 
 53. Bailey, 50 F. Supp. at 143 (“And if the employers cannot be relieved of 
their obligations or duties under the Act by any affirmative action of their em-
ployees, they cannot be relieved by any failure on the part of any such employ-
ees to insist upon a full compliance with the Act.”). 
 
 54. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 218C(b)(2) (2006) 
(“The rights and remedies in this section may not be waived by any agree-
ment, policy, form, or condition of employment.”); Bailey, 50 F. Supp. at 143. 
 55. See Bailey, 50 F. Supp. at 143; Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, 
Fact Sheet #17A: Exemption for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Com-
puter & Outside Sales Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance//fairpay/ 
fs17a_overview.pdf (July 2008) (“The FLSA provides minimum standards that 
may be exceeded, but cannot be waived or reduced.”); Dep’t of Labor, Collective 
Bargaining Agreements, FLSA HOURS WORKED ADVISOR, http://www.dol.gov/ 
elaws/esa/flsa/hoursworked/screen1c.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). 
 56. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o); Wermuth and Glenn, supra note 45, at 851–52. 
 57. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). 
 58. See Alfred and Schauer, supra note 9, at 369–75. 
 59. Compare Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that changing time is a principal activity and therefore subsequent 
walking time is compensable), and Andrako v. U.S. Steel Corp., 632 F. Supp. 
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C. DISPUTES OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF § 203(O) 
The Department of Labor has given inconsistent guidance 
on the interpretation of § 203(o). For example, in 2007, the 
DOL interpreted § 203(o) as excluding changing time from an 
employee’s principal activities.60 However in 2010, after a 
change in presidential administrations, the DOL withdrew the 
interpretation and issued new guidance allowing § 203(o) 
changing time to be considered a principal activity, stating “To 
hold otherwise would expand the § 203(o) exclusion well beyond 
the language of the statute.”61 Then again, in July 2013, the 
Agency reversed its opinion and filed an amicus brief with the 
U.S. Supreme Court arguing that § 203(o) allows employers 
and employees to bargain over the compensability of changing 
time, which may affect walking time as well.62 The opinions 
fluctuate between claiming § 203(o) is an exception to the pro-
tections of the FLSA, and thus must be interpreted narrowly,63 
and asserting that no such interpretation is necessary.64
 
2d 398, 413 (2009) (holding that while the FLSA exclusion covered time taken 
to don protective gear, it did not cover time spent walking to and from work 
after putting on or taking off clothes), with Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 
F.3d 590, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that changing time is not a principal 
activity if exempt from the FLSA under § 203(o) and therefore subsequent 
walking time is not compensable), and Sisk v. Sara Lee Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 
1001, 1011 (2008) (holding that because plaintiff offered no evidence that put-
ting on and taking off clothes were principal activities or integral or indispen-
sable to a principal activity, plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for 
those activities). 
 Adding 
to the confusion, the Agency’s interpretation of what garments 
constitute “clothes” under the provision has fluctuated even 
more than the Agency’s opinion on the relationship between 
 60. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Opinion Letter, FLSA2007-10 
(May 14, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Opinion Letter], available at http://www.dol 
.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_05_14_10_FLSA.pdf. 
 61. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Administrator’s Interpretation 
No. 2010-2, (June 16, 2010) [hereinafter Interpretation No. 2010-2], available 
at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_ 
2.pdf. 
 62. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent 
at 29, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 12-417 (Jan. 27, 2014) (“Petitioners do 
not cite any authority for the proposition that when the FLSA leaves the com-
pensability of certain activities to negotiation between employers and unions 
on behalf of covered employees, the scope of those affected activities must be 
construed narrowly against negotiation.”). 
 63. Interpretation No. 2010-2, supra note 61. 
 64. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent 
at 29, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 12-417 (Jan. 27, 2014). 
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compensability and principal activities.65 As a result of the in-
consistent rulings, federal appellate courts, despite disagreeing 
on which interpretation is correct, have agreed to largely ignore 
the DOL’s position on the issue.66
The Sixth Circuit dealt with a § 203(o) case in 2010 in a 
dispute between Kellogg and an employee at the company’s 
Rossville, Tennessee plant.
  
67 Kellogg required all hourly em-
ployees to wear uniforms consisting of “pants, snap-front shirts 
bearing the Kellogg logo and employee’s name, and slip-
resistant shoes . . . .”68 The uniform remained at the plant, so 
employees changed into their uniform upon arriving at work 
and out of their uniform before leaving for the day.69 Kellogg 
never paid its employees for the time spent changing in the 
locker room or for the time spent walking between the locker 
room and the time clock.70 The collective bargaining agreement 
governing the facility did not discuss the nonpayment policy, 
but the policy was in place at the time the union and the em-
ployer negotiated the agreement.71
An employee at the plant, Alice Franklin, brought suit on 
behalf of herself and 243 current and former employees from 
Kellogg facilities across the country to recover wages under the 
FLSA for the time spent donning and doffing the uniform and 
for the subsequent walking time.
 
72
 
 65. Compare Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Opinion Letter, FLSA 
2002-2 (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/ 
2002/2002_06_06_2_FLSA.htm#.UKG1z8Vqw80 (“[W]e interpret ‘clothes’ un-
der section 3(o) to include items worn on the body for covering, protection, or 
sanitation, but not to include tools or other implements such as knives, scab-
bards, or meat hooks.”), with Interpretation No. 2010-2, supra note 
 The court held that the cus-
tom of nonpayment for changing time was established under 
61 (“[I]t is 
the Administrator’s interpretation that the § 203(o) exemption does not extend 
to protective equipment worn by employees that is required by law, by the 
employer, or due to the nature of the job.”). 
 66. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1139 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Where, as 
here, an agency repeatedly alters its interpretation of a statute, the persuasive 
power of those interpretations is diminished.”); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 
F.3d 604, 614 (6th Cir. 2010); Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 
209, 216 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[O]ur own view rests upon the language of the 
statute, not upon the gyrating agency letters on the subject.”). 
 67. See Franklin, 619 F.3d at 604. 
 68. Id. at 608. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 607–08. 
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the plant’s collective bargaining agreement and therefore  
§ 203(o) exempted the time spent in the locker room from the 
FLSA.73 However, the court determined that “compensability 
under § 203(o) is unrelated to whether an activity is a ‘principal 
activity.’”74 Since Kellogg required employees to wear the uni-
form and the uniform primarily benefitted the company, not 
the employees, the court found changing into and out of the 
uniform was integral and indispensable to the employee’s 
work.75 Therefore, although changing time was unpaid, the 
court held it was still a principal activity, rendering subsequent 
walking time compensable.76 The court noted the differing 
views on the issue amongst the district courts, but was the first 
federal appellate court to consider the question of whether time 
spent walking to the time clock after changing clothes was 
compensable.77
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit confronted the same issue, 
when 800 current and former hourly employees at the USS 
plant in Gary, Indiana brought suit against the company for 
failing to pay them for time spent changing clothes in the lock-
er room and the time it took them to walk to the work station 
from the locker room.
 
78 As in Franklin, the practice of nonpay-
ment for the changing and walking time was established under 
a collective bargaining agreement.79 Therefore, § 203(o) exclud-
ed the changing time from the compensation requirements of 
the FLSA.80 However, the court did not follow the same reason-
ing as the Sixth Circuit when it determined if the walking time 
needed to be paid under the FLSA.81 Instead, the court found 
that changing clothes was not a principal activity, stating, “Not 
all requirements imposed on employees constitute employ-
ment.”82 Thus, if the union and employer had agreed that 
changing time was not compensable work time, then according 
to the Seventh Circuit, it was not part of the employee’s princi-
pal activities.83
 
 73. Id. at 618. 
 Under this interpretation, the employees’ work 
 74. Id. at 619. 
 75. Id. at 620 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 619–20. 
 78. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 591 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 79. Id. at 591–92. 
 80. Id. at 595. 
 81. Id. at 597–98. 
 82. Id. at 596. 
 83. Id.  
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day did not begin until they reached the work station, and thus 
the walk from the locker room did not need to be paid. The 
court acknowledged the contrary Sixth Circuit decision, but 
called it “clearly wrong,” and argued that the “Franklin opinion 
offers only a conclusion, not reasons.”84
Together, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits created a system 
where a worker must be compensated for travel time in some 
states, but not in others, perpetuating the difficulty of defining 
the workday for employers and employees, in addition to incon-
sistently enforcing FLSA protections.
 
85
D. SUPREME COURT WILL DEFINE “CHANGING CLOTHES” BUT 
WILL NOT ADDRESS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN § 203(O) AND 
COMPENSABILITY OF TRAVEL TIME 
 
On February 19, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the 
petition filed by the U.S. Steel employees for a writ of certiorari 
to review Sandifer.86 However, the Court limited its review to 
one question87: “What constitutes ‘changing clothes’ within the 
meaning of section 203(o)?”88 The petitioners presented the re-
lationship between principal activities and § 203(o) as question 
two of their petition,89 but the Court denied certiorari on the is-
sue,90 leaving the inquiry unanswered.91 Regardless of how the 
Court chooses to define “changing clothes” under § 203(o), the 
effect of the provision on the compensability of subsequent 
walking time under the FLSA will still differ depending on the 
jurisdiction.92
 
 84. Id. at 598. 
 Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s review of the 
Sandifer case, further guidance and uniformity on this issue is 
needed. 
 85. See Alfred & Schauer, supra note 9, at 363. 
 86. Sandifer, 678 F.3d 590, cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. Feb. 19, 
2013) (No. 12-417). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sandifer, 678 F.3d 590 (No. 12-417). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Sandifer, 678 F.3d 590, cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. Feb. 
19, 2013) (No. 12-417). 
 91. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 226 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (“This Court has said again and again and again that such a denial [of a 
petition for certiorari] has no legal significance whatever bearing on the merits 
of the claim. The denial means that this Court has refused to take the case. It 
means nothing else.”). 
 92. See supra Part I.C. 
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II.  INCOMPLETE DECISIONS: HOW SECTION 203(O) 
LITIGATION FAILS TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS 
ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING   
Congress passed § 203(o) in response to the Court’s expan-
sive interpretation of the FLSA,93 as an attempt to give power 
back to negotiations between unions and employers.94 At the 
time, Congress believed that collective bargaining was the best 
mechanism for protecting American employee rights.95 Howev-
er, the passage of time has proven that collective bargaining 
agreements in many ways fail to adequately protect employ-
ees.96 Despite collective bargaining’s continually ineffective de-
fense of employee rights, when the federal appellate courts are 
charged with interpreting § 203(o) of the FLSA—a section ex-
plicitly discussing collective bargaining agreements97—the 
courts fail to consider the policy implications of either restrict-
ing or expanding the reach of collective bargaining.98
This section will analyze the congressional intent behind  
§ 203(o) and both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ attempts at 
interpreting the provision. 
 
 
 93. See Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 45, at 841, 844. 
 94. Id. at 853–54. 
 95. See Bales, supra note 46, at 688. 
 96. See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Work-
place, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 169, 169 (1991) (“For many workers, the rights that 
matter most come from public law and not from private collective bargaining 
agreements.”); see also Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2685–86 (2008) (discussing the National Labor Rela-
tions Act’s failure to protect workers). 
 97. The FLSA provides in relevant part:  
In determining . . . hours for which an employee is employed, there 
shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing at 
the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from 
measured working time during the week involved by the express 
terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-
bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee. 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2012). 
 98. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 618–19 (6th Cir. 2010) (fail-
ing to discuss the effect an interpretation of the relationship between compen-
sability and principal activities has on the reach of collective bargaining 
agreements); see also Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 595–98 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (similarly failing to consider the limits of collective bargaining 
agreements when determining if a non-compensable activity can be principal). 
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A. CONGRESS PASSED § 203(O) WITH AN UNREALISTIC VISION OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 
Amendments to the FLSA, such as § 203(o) and the Portal-
to-Portal Act, represent a congressional attempt to give power 
to collective bargaining agreements in the hope that employees 
would successfully negotiate for their own rights through un-
ions.99 Although Congress wanted to provide a bare minimum 
wage and maximum hours through legislation, the FLSA draft-
ers hoped for unions to negotiate beyond its provisions.100 In a 
statement to Congress in 1938, President Roosevelt spoke of 
the promise the country saw in unions, stating, “I have spoken 
of labor as another essential in the three great groups of the 
population in raising the Nation’s income. Definite strides in 
collective bargaining have been made, and the right of labor to 
organize has been nationally recognized.”101
In 1954, 34.7 percent of nonagricultural workers in the 
United States belonged to unions.
 Over the years, 
however, the era’s vision of labor relations proved inaccurate, 
leading to the increased importance of legislation protecting in-
dividual rights. 
102 However, by 2013 only 11.3 
percent of wage and salary workers were covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement.103
 
 99. See Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251(b) (2012) (“It is declared to be 
the policy of the Congress . . . to protect the right of collective bargaining  
. . . .”); see also Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 
 Some of the most important work-
place rights, such as the right to fair treatment free from dis-
crimination, the right to health and safety in the workplace, 
and the right to some economic securities, are protected by 
45, at 854 (quoting Representa-
tive Herter’s discussion of § 203(o) as an amendment to avoid broad court in-
terpretations of employee rights that led to the Portal-to-Portal Act and stat-
ing that collective bargaining agreements have “been carefully threshed out 
between the employer and the employees and apparently both are completely 
satisfied with respect to their bargaining agreements”). 
 100. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 3, 
1938), in 83 CONG. REC. 8, 9 (1938), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb 
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15517 (“[M]ore desirable wages are and should contin-
ue to be the product of collective bargaining.”). 
 101. Id. at 10.  
 102. Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an 
American Works Councils Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 607, 616 (2004). 
 103. Union Members—2013, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 24, 2014), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. See generally Ste-
ven Greenhouse, Union Membership Rate Fell Again in 2011, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/business/union-membership-rate 
-fell-again-in-2011.html (discussing the “decades-long slide” of union member-
ship in the United States). 
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statutes, not unions.104 The abundance of employee rights pro-
tected through legislation suggests the public has recognized 
that some rights cannot be protected by collective bargaining, 
or perhaps are too important to be left up to market forces.105
Scholars point to many reasons why collective bargaining 
failed to become the primary mode of securing employee rights 
in America.
  
106 Some suggest that the weaknesses of the NLRA 
were a cause.107 The NLRA grants workers the right to organ-
ize, but fails to provide remedies to adequately protect the em-
ployees who choose to do so.108 Under the Act, an employee may 
seek compensatory damages, but not punitive damages, leaving 
an insufficient deterrent for employers disrupting workers’ 
rights.109 The Act also fails to cover a growing number of Ameri-
can employees, independent contractors,110 not only excluding 
those workers, but also undermining the unity required for 
covered employees working alongside contractors to unionize.111
 
 104. See Rabin, supra note 
 
96, at 170, 175–84. See generally Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2012) (prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination against employees over the age of thirty nine); Occu-
pational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012) (creating the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration to assure safe and healthful 
working conditions for employees); Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (setting minimum standards for pension 
plans); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102 
(2012) (requiring employers to provide notification sixty days prior to mass 
layoffs); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) 
(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.  
§ 12101 (2012) (prohibiting employment discrimination against qualified em-
ployees with disabilities). 
 105. See Rabin, supra note 96, at 171, 192. 
 106. See, e.g., id. at 193 (arguing the labor movement recognized that it 
needed the larger resources of the government to effectively create workers’ 
rights); Sachs, supra note 96, at 2694–95 (arguing the NLRA fails to adequate-
ly protect collective activity). 
 107. See Sachs, supra note 96, at 2694–95. 
 108. See id. See generally Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ 
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769–
1803 (1983) (discussing the failures of the NLRA regime). 
 109. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012). 
 110. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (excluding independent contractors from the 
definition of “employee”); Rick Marin, Can Manhood Survive the Recession, 
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.newsweek.com/can-manhood-survive 
-recession-66607 (“The number of so-called independent contractors is up by 
more than one million since 2005, according to Jeffrey Eisenach, an economist 
at George Mason University.”). 
 111. See Sachs, supra note 96, at 2700 (“As the Supreme Court has ob-
served, excluding a subset of a given workforce from the purview of labor law 
makes it more difficult for all of the employees in that workforce to organize 
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Other scholars point not to the NLRA, but to the practice of 
collective bargaining itself.112 Collective bargaining is based in 
part on the power of the employee to strike.113 However, in to-
day’s workforce, an employer can easily replace workers or sub-
contract the work until the strike is over, severely weakening 
the bargaining power of the union.114 In addition, worker safety 
involving issues such as chemical exposure requires technical 
knowledge that many employees do not have, and therefore is 
better managed by a government agency like the Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration.115 These areas also require 
uniform enforcement across the industry, and the resources of 
the government enable OSHA and other regulatory agencies to 
ensure compliance more effectively than a union.116 Unions 
themselves recognized this limitation and strongly supported 
the creation of OSHA.117 Finally, some employee benefits, such 
as healthcare, affect society as a whole.118 Therefore, govern-
ment regulation ensuring that all workers have access to such 
a benefit, rather than just those protected by a specific collec-
tive bargaining agreement, is advantageous for the entire coun-
try.119
Regardless of the reason for the shift from collective bar-
gaining to a system based on public rights, it does not appear 
that the trend will reverse itself in the near future.
 
120
 
and act collectively.”); cf. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984) 
(stating that excluding undocumented employees from the NLRA would 
“erod[e] the unity of all the employees and imped[e] effective collective bar-
gaining”). 
 Today, 
non-unionized employees often enjoy more workplace rights 
 112. See Rabin, supra note 96, at 193–95. 
 113. Id. at 194. 
 114. Id. at 194–95. 
 115. Id. at 195. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
& HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (providing 
information about OSHA). 
 116. See Rabin, supra note 96, at 195. 
 117. See James C. Miller III, Is Organized Labor Rational in Supporting 
OSHA?, 50 S. ECON. J. NO. 3 881, 881 (1984); Rabin, supra note 96, at 193 
(“By helping to enact this legislation, the movement recognizes that it needs 
the larger resources of government to do its job.”). 
 118. Rabin, supra note 96, at 196. 
 119. Id. at 192–96. 
 120. Befort, supra note 102, at 632 (suggesting that “factors, such as the 
global economy, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and America’s traditional an-
tipathy for collective action, will continue to militate against any greater re-
bound in union strength”). 
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than those protected by collective bargaining agreements.121 
Provisions such as § 203(o), which seek to protect the right to 
negotiate, often ensure, in practice, that statutory individual 
rights created for all workers do not apply to unionized employ-
ees.122
B. SECTION 203(O) LITIGATION’S FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE 
IMPLICATIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FLSA AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 Thus, the hope for the future of collective bargaining that 
inspired the drafters to include § 203(o) in the FLSA is mis-
placed in the realities of today’s workplace, where many rights 
must be publicly protected, rather than bargained for. 
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have contrary holdings re-
garding the effect of § 203(o) on the compensability of subse-
quent activities.123 But neither decision established a precedent 
sufficient to protect employee rights in future cases. Each case 
focused narrowly on the definition of a principal activity and 
both failed to consider how a decision either way would affect 
the power of collective bargaining to put rights protected by the 
FLSA on the bargaining table.124
The Sixth Circuit required employers to pay for the walk-
ing time, but provided no rationale, leaving a weak precedent 
for future challenges to employee rights.
 
125
 
 121. Bales, supra note 
 The court barely an-
alyzed the language of § 203(o), and instead simply addressed 
the different positions taken by courts across the country, and 
46, at 690. 
 122. Cf. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2012); 
Livadas v. Aubry, 943 F.2d 1140, 1150 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting) (“It is not inconceivable that an employer could point to this discrep-
ancy [between rights available to non-unionized employees, but not unionized 
workers] as an argument against an effort to unionize . . . .”); Bales, supra note 
46, at 690, 742–45 (discussing court interpretations of the Labor Management 
Relations Act and the Federal Arbitration Act that “effectively withdr[ew] 
from unionized employees many of the individual employment rights that 
statutes or common law ostensibly confer on all employees”). 
 123. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 124. See Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596–97 (holding that § 203(o) “permits the 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement to reclassify changing time as 
nonworking time,” but failing to discuss the implications of that decision on 
future collective bargaining agreements); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 619 (holding 
that “compensability under § 203(o) is unrelated to whether an activity is a 
‘principal activity,’” but failing to provide a rationale for that decision). 
 125. See Franklin, 619 F.3d at 619 (concluding that compensability is unre-
lated to the principal activity analysis without providing any rationale). 
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then announced which proposition it agreed with.126 The only 
analysis provided by the court is that § 203(o) addresses the 
compensability of changing time, not its standing as integral 
and indispensable.127 The Sixth Circuit is correct, and identified 
an important feature of § 203(o), but did not go any further to 
discuss the implications of the language.128 What the court 
failed to recognize is that any interpretation allowing collective 
bargaining agreements to determine if an activity is principal 
to an employee’s work gives the contract authority to affect the 
compensability of other activities, beyond the changing time 
explicitly discussed in the provision. Section 203(o) represents a 
congressional attempt to give some bargaining rights back to 
unions and employers;129
The Seventh Circuit likewise failed to consider the implica-
tions of its decision on the balance between collective bargain-
ing agreements and statutes that protect American workers’ 
rights. Although the opinion provided more analysis than the 
Sixth Circuit’s, and discussed the reach of collective bargaining 
in a limited manner, it failed to consider the position of collec-
tive bargaining in society today.
 however, any interpretation of the 
provision must consider how many of the rights afforded in the 
FLSA will be put on the bargaining table and how that will af-
fect employees in future conflicts between collective bargaining 
and statutes. 
130 The court focused on the 
idea that if an employee is not paid for an activity, it is not an 
activity for which he is employed.131 However, like the Sixth 
Circuit, the Seventh Circuit did not discuss § 203(o) as a provi-
sion striking a compromise between the right to collectively 
bargain and the statutory rights promised by the FLSA.132
 
 126. Id. 
 In-
stead, the court quickly decided that Congress meant to give 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 45, at 854. 
 130. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“Section 203(o) permits the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to 
reclassify changing time as nonworking time . . . .”). 
 131. See id. at 596 (“[C]hanging time is not work time and need not be 
compensated. If it is not work time—the workers aren’t being paid and their 
union has agreed to their not being paid—how can it be one of the ‘principal 
 . . . activities which [the] employee is employed to perform’? . . . Not all re-
quirements imposed on employees constitute employment.”) (alterations in 
original) (quoting the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) 
(2012)). 
 132. See id. at 597–98; Franklin, 619 F.3d at 615–16. 
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full power to union negotiations,133
The DOL’s fluctuating opinion on the issue is even worse 
than the weak reasoning of the Sixth Circuit and the oversim-
plification of the Seventh Circuit. Without ever addressing the 
implications of its interpretations on the reach of collective 
bargaining, the DOL gives the impression that the decision is a 
trivial matter.
 an oversimplification of the 
provision that fails to consider the implications of that broad 
interpretation in the realities of the modern workplace. 
134 The DOL’s 2007 interpretation letter simply 
states that § 203(o) removed changing time from hours worked, 
and therefore from principal activities, and did not inquire fur-
ther.135 The 2010 DOL interpretation did recognize what is at 
stake with this decision, stating that the exclusion from com-
pensability by a collective bargaining agreement does not make 
the activity any less integral or indispensable.136 However, in 
its 2013 amicus brief, the DOL returned to its naïve interpreta-
tion, refusing to consider the lack of success of collective bar-
gaining today.137
The split over the interpretation of § 203(o) represents a 
choice with implications for the future of employee rights. 
When deciding if the unpaid changing time is a principal activi-
ty, the courts choose either an expansive right to contract, lim-
iting the scope of the guaranteed employee rights provided in 
the FLSA, or choose a narrow interpretation limiting the power 
of collective bargaining and preserving the statutory rights af-
forded to American workers. Congress passed § 203(o) with a 
prediction for the future of collective bargaining in American 
society that did not prove true. The litigation over the compen-
sability of this short period of time, the walk from the locker 
room to the work station, presents an opportunity to issue a 
uniform decision with precedential value for future conflicts
 
138
 
 133. Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 597–98. 
 
between statutory rights and collective bargaining agreements. 
 134. See generally Interpretation No. 2010-2, supra note 61; 2007 Opinion 
Letter, supra note 60. 
 135. 2007 Opinion Letter, supra note 60 (“Accordingly, activities covered by 
section 3(o) cannot be considered principal activities and do not start the 
workday. Walking time after a 3(o) activity is therefore not compensable un-
less it is preceded by a principal activity.”). 
 136. Interpretation No. 2010-2, supra note 61. 
 137. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent 
at 29, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 12-417 (Jan. 27, 2014). 
 138. See, e.g., infra note 142. 
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III.  SECTION 203(O) PRESENTS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A 
SUPREME COURT DECISION LIMITING COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING’S EFFECT ON STATUTORY RIGHTS   
As the circuit split demonstrates, the text of § 203(o) lends 
itself to arguments both that the Act removes changing time 
from being defined as a principal activity and that it simply 
removes changing time from compensability, but not classifica-
tion as a principal activity.139 Therefore, the textual argument 
advanced by each court is insufficient to resolve the issue, and 
Clifton Sandifer is still getting paid for less time than the em-
ployee performing the same duties at the plant in Michigan.140
Given the ambiguous text of the provision, and the change 
in the position of collective bargaining in society from the time 
Congress passed § 203(o) to today, § 203(o) litigation presents 
an opportunity to set a precedent for a narrow interpretation of 
FLSA exemptions based on collective bargaining agreements. 
Resolving the conflict over the compensability of this fairly in-
significant activity, walking from the locker room to the work 
station, can create a framework for understanding other future 
conflicts between collective bargaining and statutory individual 
rights. The Supreme Court of the United States should resolve 
the circuit split and hold that when unionized employees’ statu-
tory rights are in jeopardy, courts must restrict the negotiable 
statutory terms to a narrow interpretation of the language of 
the legislature, preserving as many individual statutory guar-
antees as possible. In this case, the FLSA explicitly allows em-
ployees to bargain away their compensation for changing and 
washing time, but does not discuss pay for walking time.
 
141 
Thus, the only activities explicitly exempt from compensable 
work time are changing and washing, and the most restrictive 
interpretation of the provision would not allow any other activi-
ty to be unpaid based on that agreement. Resolving the split in 
this way would not only end the conflicts over walking time, 
but would also provide an analysis applicable anytime a collec-
tive bargaining agreement purports to affect statutory rights.142
 
 139. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(arguing that the text of § 203(o) allows parties to “reclassify changing time as 
nonworking time”); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 618 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(finding that the text of “§ 203(o) only addresses the compensability of the 
time, not whether it is integral and indispensable”); supra note 
 
97. 
 140. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 141. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2012). 
 142. For example, the FLSA allows employers and employees to reach a 
collective bargaining agreement exempting the employer from following over 
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A. RESTRICTING THE REACH OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
PROTECTS STATUTORY EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 
As previously discussed, over time, collective bargaining 
has proven to be an ineffective way of guaranteeing many im-
portant employee rights.143 When striking a balance between 
statutory rights and the freedom to collectively bargain, courts 
must recognize that the unequal bargaining power between the 
employer and the employees affects the ability of the workers to 
secure their own rights.144
Proponents of a more expansive interpretation of negotia-
ble rights assert that publicly protected rights impermissibly 
limit the freedom to contract. Opponents of the Sixth Circuit’s 
opinion suggest that walking time compensation should also be 
negotiable, as that interpretation would promote the freedom of 
contract, which has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a 
fundamental right.
 Restricting negotiable legal rights to 
the most limited understanding provided by the statute guar-
antees a minimum amount of rights for all employees, regard-
less of union membership.  
145 However, past attempts at holding the 
freedom to contract above employee rights have been widely 
criticized.146
 
time requirements. See id. § 207(b)(1)–(2), (f). This Note’s proposed Supreme 
Court holding could provide precedent for future interpretations of these sec-
tions. 
 Thus, although a court is free to recognize freedom 
 143. See supra Part II.A. 
 144. See Rabin, supra note 96, at 194–95 (discussing the workers’ ability to 
effectively collectively bargain). Commentators have criticized court opinions 
assuming equal bargaining power between employers and employees. Cf. 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 69 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It may 
be that the statute [setting maximum hours for employees in bakeries] had its 
origin, in part, in the belief that employers and employees in such establish-
ments were not upon an equal footing, and that the necessities of the latter 
often compelled them to submit to such exactions as unduly taxed their 
strength.”). 
 145. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“While this Court 
has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the 
term has received much consideration and some of the included things have 
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bod-
ily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract . . . .”); Lochner, 198 
U.S. at 53 (“The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is 
part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution.”). 
 146. David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 
373 (2003) (stating Lochner v. New York, a 1905 Supreme Court decision over-
turning a worker protection law based on its infringement on the freedom to 
contract, is perhaps “the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred 
years”). 
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to contract as an important constitutional right, it cannot do so 
at the expense of employee rights.147 Instead, conflicts between 
the freedom to contract and statutory rights must be viewed 
with the understanding that some public interests supersede 
the right to contract.148 A Supreme Court decision requiring a 
narrow interpretation of exemptions to statutory exemptions is 
a suitable compromise between the importance of the freedom 
of contract and the necessity of publicly protected employee 
rights. The decision would allow collective bargaining above the 
floor provided by the legislature, without putting freedom to 
contract above all else, a viewpoint which has been utterly re-
jected over time.149
In addition, restricting the effect of collective bargaining 
agreements on statutory rights does not suggest that collective 
bargaining has no place in society at all. Proponents of collec-
tive bargaining point to limitations of individual statutory em-
ployee rights, including the failure of administrative agencies 
to enforce statutes and the lack of resources for individual em-
ployees looking to sue over a violation, to argue that collective 
bargaining still serves an important function in protecting em-
ployee rights.
  
150 However, the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement must be closely monitored to protect employee 
rights.151 Although some would argue that placing more statu-
tory rights on the negotiating table, such as compensation for 
walking time, would allow employees to more effectively nego-
tiate, as previously discussed, relying on the power of the work-
ers to negotiate for their own rights has created a system where 
union members often have fewer rights than non-union mem-
bers.152
 
 147. Id. at 373 (“You have to reject Lochner if you want to be in the main-
stream of American constitutional law today.”). 
 Therefore, protecting statutory rights from the bargain-
ing table is appropriate in today’s workplace, as it preserves 
those rights guaranteed to all workers, while still allowing em-
ployees and employers to negotiate for other terms. Statutes 
 148. Id. at 375 (“It is one thing to enforce freedom of contract in a limited 
and qualified way; it is quite another to make freedom of contract a preemi-
nent constitutional value that repeatedly prevails over legislation that, in the 
eyes of elected representatives, serves important social purposes.”). 
 149. See id. See generally W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–
400 (1937) (upholding a Washington minimum wage law and marking the 
Court’s departure from Lochner). 
 150. See Bales, supra note 46, at 749–50. 
 151. See supra Part II.A (discussing collective bargaining’s failure to ade-
quately protect workers’ rights). 
 152. Bales, supra note 46, at 690. 
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like the FLSA provide a floor, and unions are welcome to bar-
gain beyond their provisions, as long as they do not jeopardize 
the statutory guarantees provided by law. 
B. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ISSUE A DECISION PROVIDING 
A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AND LABOR STATUTES 
Section 203(o) litigation provides an opportunity to remove 
the provision from the historical view of collective bargaining 
and place it in the realities of today, setting an example for fu-
ture conflicts between collective bargaining and statutory 
guarantees. The statute explicitly allows employees to bargain 
away their compensation for changing and washing time,153 but 
the provision does not explicitly require or allow employees to 
give up their compensation for walking time.154
  CONCLUSION   
 Therefore, the 
Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split in favor of the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Franklin and should emphasize the 
importance of restricting the reach of collective bargaining 
when the agreement touches statutory rights. By holding that  
§ 203(o) only affects the compensability of changing and wash-
ing time, and not its status as a principal activity, the Court 
will set a precedent for restrictive interpretations of negotiable 
statutory rights. Any future conflicts regarding what statutory 
rights are on the bargaining table would then be resolved by 
using a narrow interpretation, limiting the effect of the provi-
sion to the negotiable rights explicitly named by the statute, 
thus guaranteeing employee rights for all workers, unionized or 
not. 
Since Congress passed § 203(o), collective bargaining has 
proved to be an ineffective protection for many basic employee 
rights.155 Today, non-unionized workers have more rights than 
many unionized workers.156
 
 153. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2012). 
 The disparity represents the need 
for judicial decisions narrowly interpreting the statutory em-
ployee rights that may be put on the bargaining table in a con-
tract between an employer and a union. The debate over the 
 154. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2010) (“We 
agree with the courts that have taken the position that compensability under  
§ 203(o) is unrelated to whether an activity is a ‘principal activity.’”). 
 155. See supra Part II.A. 
 156. Bales, supra note 46, at 690. 
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meaning of § 203(o) presents an opportunity for the U.S. Su-
preme Court to issue a decision creating a precedent for inter-
pretations that limit the reach of collective bargaining agree-
ments to only the authority explicitly given to them by 
Congress, thus protecting statutory rights guaranteed to all 
employees, regardless of union membership. Clifton Sandifer’s 
walk to the locker room may be short in time, but requiring his 
employer to pay him for those few minutes would bring long 
lasting effects to statutory employee rights. 
 
 
